What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a framework characterized by: a) common uncertainty on potential output, and b) imperfect knowledge of the central bank target (and inference of the true policy reaction function) by the private sector. We show that full transparency is socially beneficial under a variety of parametrizations. Our results confirm, in a different set up, those of Faust and Svensson
Introduction
Monetary policy transparency has considerably increased across countries in the last decade. This development is probably linked with the fact that many central banks have recently adopted (more or less explicitly) an inflationtargeting regime, where it is essential for the central bank to be able to anchor private sector's expectations. In a forward-looking environment, it would seem natural to be pro-transparency, as extensively argued in Woodford (2003).
However, Morris and Shin (2002) have seriously challenged this belief and opened a lively debate in the economic literature 1 . They argue that there can be a cost in providing more accurate public information, as agents may overreact to such information. In this framework, agents formulate expectations based on the underlying fundamentals, but a coordination motive arises from strategic complementarity in their actions. As a result, agents may be too sensitive to forecast errors in public information. Svensson Examples of such signals are the short-term policy rate set by central banks or its economic forecasts. The introduction of transparency issues along these lines leads Walsh (2007) to show that more economic transparency is not always welfare beneficial. The optimal degree of transparency depends on the relative quality of the signals available to the central bank and the 1 Actually, Morris and Shin's paper was commented and discussed also outside the academia. The Economist, for example, in 2004 published an article which was inspired by the result found by Morris and Shin and whose title was "It's Not Always Good To Talk". private sector and on the relative central bank's ability to forecast aggregate demand and supply shocks: if the central bank obtains more accurate signals on cost shocks, optimal transparency increases, whereas if it obtains more accurate signals on demand shocks, optimal transparency decreases.
In modeling the information structure within the private sector, Walsh allows for firm-specific shocks and follows Cornand and Heinemann (2006) , who introduce a rationale for partial transparency, in the sense of partial release of information. They find that extensive release of public information may induce excessive sensitivity of agents' expectations to noises in public information (as in Morris and Shin). However, if public information can be released only to a proportion of agents, there is only a limited effect on the higher-order expectations, thereby avoiding coordination failures and restoring positive values of (partial) transparency.
In this paper we investigate whether central bank's political transparency is desirable in presence of incomplete information about the state of the economy. We will assume that the central bank and the private sector share the same incomplete information on potential output. Moreover, the private sector does not observe the policy targets and cannot exactly infer the policy reaction function, linking the choice of the policy instrument to the final objectives. Orphanides (2001 widely documented the relevance a common noise in the measure of potential output for central bank's policy. Cuckierman and Lippi (2005) showed that, even if the policymakers efficiently estimate potential output, this does not avoid persistent retrospective policy errors. An interesting question is, therefore, if a more transparent central bank can limit the welfare cost of having incomplete information about potential output.
From a methodological point of view, this paper contributes to the literature which analyzes problems of incomplete information in DSGE models.
In most papers it has been assumed an information structure featuring a common information set for the private sector larger than the central bank's one (Svensson and Woodford (2004) , Boivin and Giannoni (2008)) 2 . We start by observing that policy objectives and intentions are not always revealed explicitly and truthfully to the public. Hence, we assume asymmetric information about policy targets in favor of the central bank and we analyze whether disclosing such policy targets may be beneficial in a framework of incomplete common information on potential output.
The paper is organized as follows: we describe the model in section 2 and we solve it in its state-space form in section 3. In section 4 we show the numerical properties of the model and check the robustness of our findings.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
The model
We will focus on the informational side of a microfounded DSGE model featuring nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. The supply-side of the economy is modeled according to a New Keynesian Phillips curve: 3 .
where β is the discount factor, 1−ω is the constant fraction of firms adjusting their prices (Calvo's parameter), κ is the sum of the coefficient on relative risk aversion and the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply, and s t is a cost-push shock. The cost-push shock is assumed to be an AR(1) process:
Since only cost-push shocks posit policy trade-offs, we follow Faust and
Svensson (2002) and Walsh (2006 Walsh ( , 2007 ) and work with a simplified version 2 Svensson and Woodford (2004) claim that the only case of asymmetric information in which it is coherent to assume a common information set for all members of private sector is the case in which the private sector has complete information about the state of the economy and the central bank does not. In fact, only in this case "the model's equations can be expressed in terms of aggregate equations that refer to only a single private sector information set, while at the same time, these model equations are treated as structural, and hence invariant under the alternative policies".
3 See the Appendix for a quick derivation of the NKPC and Woodford (2003) for an extensive discussion of the complete microfoundation of DSGE models.
of the demand side. We assume that the central bank has imperfect control over the level of output (treated as a policy instrument, see below) and, in turn, over the output gap. More precisely, the following stochastic structure is adopted: a) an autoregressive error term η t makes the intended output gap y I t − y t deviate from the actual output gap y t − y t ;
b) potential output is autoregressive: y t = ρ y y t−1 + g t ;
c) The central bank and the private sector share a distorted observation of the true potential output because of a measurement error:
Considering y t as the policy instrument of the central bank is only a simplifying assumption. In the standard case of an IS equation derived from first principles, with consumption dynamics depending on real interest rates, we could treat either inflation or output as a control variable and subsequently derive the interest rate which is coherent with the prescribed relationship between output and inflation. 4 The central bank is assumed to minimize the following loss function:
where π * t is a stochastic inflation target, with the following AR(1) representation:
The assumption of a stochastic inflation target reflects the idea that the intended output, the central bank's policy instrument, which is related to the true inflation target. More specifically, the private sector is assumed to receive a signal ψ t of y I t satisfying the following condition:
ψ t is independent of χ t , which is assumed to be a mean-zero normal shock.
The private sector observes the central bank's signal ψ t : the more transparent the central bank is about the signal, the better will be the private 5 The supply shocks are connected to the New Keynesian model used as the reference model constituting the theoretical background of the estimation. In particular, the supply shocks are linked to the elasticity of demand for the intermediate goods and the aggregate technology shocks respectively. 6 The policy implication is, hence, that a time-varying inflation target had relevant implications in terms of actual observed inflation: the American inflation in the 70s would have been lower if the Federal Reserve had maintained a constant inflation target. 
State-space form
The economy can be described by
where X t is a vector containing the predetermined variables y t , s t , η t and π * t . y I t is the intended policy which corresponds to output unless for a shock η t and, finally, u t+1 is a composite vector of structural shocks with covariance matrix given by Σ u . All the matrices are of appropriate dimensions.
The period loss function is a quadratic form of the goal variables Y t in which W is a positive-semidefinite weight matrix:
where W ≡ 
The third block deals with the measurement equation:
The matrix D selects the elements of the vectors X t and π t which can be observed; the central bank, in fact, can observe inflation target without noise, while potential output is observed with a noise ν t . On the other hand, the private sector has a different information set than the central bank since its measurement error of potential output is still given by ν t , but it does not observe the inflation target. In (10) 
Non-inertial policy rule and signal-extraction problems
In order to solve the signal-extraction problem for both the agents involved in the model, we first need to solve the policy problem. We concentrate on a discretionary, non-inertial equilibrium as in Svensson (2001, 2002) . In this case, the central bank follows a linear rule where its intended output is a function of the contemporary states of the economy:
The private sector has to learn the time-varying policy target without observing y I t and π t directly. This learning process will be contingent on the signal ψ t on the intended output received by the private sector. Since π t and y I t are unobserved by the private sector, we can go through (11) and (7) and solve the estimation-problem.
The variable
would allow to pin down the observation of inflation target if monetary policy is fully transparent. In this case, in fact, χ t → 0, hence the signal ψ t coincides with the intended output and, in turn, the difference between (12) and (11) amounts to −γ 4 π * t . Since the inflation target is not observable, however, (12) minus (11) includes also an error term, given by χ t . Therefore, for a given policy (11) chosen by the central bank, the private sector will infer the inflation target by using the following expression:
Notice that the private sector's inference about the inflation target depends on the central bank decision to reveal its intended output. In other words, it is not necessary for the central bank to explicitly reveal π t in order to be transparent about its inflation target Solving this policy problem, we get a policy function, i.e. a matrix F constituted by the γ coefficients in (11) and a matrix G which links inflation to the states of the economy. We can plug these two matrices into 
whereas, for the private sector it will be the following:
4 Parametrization and numerical results Faust and Svensson (2001) show how to derive an analytical expression for the policy coefficients using the methods of undetermined coefficients.
However, to study the properties of the model and evaluate the effect of varying the degree of transparency, they had to follow numerical methods.
We will solve the model numerically. Our calibration relies on standard numerical values in the literature (see Woodford, 2003 , and Giordani and Söderlind, 2004) . The discount factor β is set equal to 0.99, the degree of price stickiness ω is set equal to 0.66. We set the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion equal to 2 and the inverse of labor-supply elasticity equal to 1.5: hence, the implied value for κ is 3.5. 7 The autoregressive 7 The slope coefficient of the new Keynesian Phillips curve can be expressed according to the following representation:
where σ stands for the coefficient of relative risk aversion and φ is the inverse of labor supply elasticity.
coefficient of potential output is assumed to be 0.7, while for both the costpush and the demand shock we pick a value of 0. Given this set of structural parameters, we simulate the stochastic properties of the shocks and the measurement errors. We solve the model for 100,000 draws of a uniform distribution for the variance of potential output, cost-push shock, demand shock and the inflation target. Specifically, we . Of course, for high levels of transparency (i.e. τ → 1), σ 2 ψ coincides with σ 2 η , while the less transparent the central bank is, the less informative is ψ t about the intended policy y I t . We distinguish three regimes of transparency and for each of them we draw 100,000 points from a uniform distribution and, in turn, for the value of σ 2 χ . In particular, we consider a low level of transparency for τ ∈ [0, .3], a medium level of transparency if τ ∈ (.3, .6] and finally a high level of transparency when τ ∈ (.6, 1]. For each of these parameter spaces, we draw 100,000 points uniformly and then compute residually the value of σ 2 χ before computing the loss functions. Then the model is solved both for the central bank and the private sector. The average values of all the losses computed for these draws are shown in Table 1 : the loss function for the central bank turns out to be independent of the degree of transparency, while that of the private sector is computed for each of the three different levels of central bank transparency.
As these loss functions can be considered a natural measure of welfare for the households 8 , we compare the outcomes arising when the central bank decides to be more or less transparent. Table 1 shows that, given a loss function equal to 267.11 for the central bank, the private sector is better off when it is able to disentangle the error component in the instrument set by the central bank. In fact, the loss function for the private sector amounts to 317.44 for the first range of transparency that we consider; it is sufficient to increase the degree of transparency to the range (. 
Alternative scenarios and robustness
In this section, we undertake robustness analysis and check wether our results hold true when considering a) heterogeneity in the information set within the private sector, and b) heterogeneity in the information set between the central bank and the private sector with respect to observation of potential output.
We believe it is worthy to consider the effects of different information (2007)), justified the presence of a fraction of uninformed agents by invoking rational inattentionà la Sims, and considered the latter as a perfect substitute for low transparency. However, this equivalence is not obvious, as central bankers may be unable to inform only a fraction of agents. Figure 1 shows the percentage change in social loss relative to the case of full transparency.
We find that partial release of information is never optimal, unlike some previous results in the literature. In figure 1 
where ϑ and ̟ indicate the precision of the signals received by central bank and private sector respectively. Under the assumption of uncertainty about the quality of the two signals (16) and (17), the private sector's learning process uses a linear combination of these: Table 2 shows the numerical properties of this modification to our baseline model, for different levels of transparency as defined above. We still obtain that the private sector's loss is decreasing in the degree of central bank transparency, even when the private sector's signal on potential output is more precise.
Finally, in Figure 2 we show the percentage change in social loss relative to the case of full transparency as a function of the number of informed agents. The message remains coherent with that of Figure 1 above. Social welfare improves when all the agents are informed. Hence, it is not sufficient to assume that the private sector about potential output to modify the conclusion in favor of full transparency and full release of information.
Concluding remarks
In the last two decades we have observed a sharp increase in the degree of central bank transparency. In this paper, we justify this choice by numer- Moreover, it also holds when the private sector is assumed to have better information on potential output with respect to the central bank.
From a methodological point of view, the major contribution of the paper is to extend the analysis of informational asymmetries in a DSGE model to the case of an unobservable policy goal.
A Derivation of the NKPC
Firms set pricesà la Calvo (1983). Each period a random fraction (1−ω) sets new prices so that the aggregate price level evolves as a convex combination of the lagged price level p t−1 and optimal reset prices p * t :
For the price-adjusting firms, the optimal reset price will be equal to the expected discounted value of current and future nominal marginal cost mc t , markup µ and a cost-push shock s t affecting the firm's desired price:
The previous expression can be written in a more compact form:
Under the price structure for p t , a log-linear version of the domestic price inflation around a zero inflation steady state is
which, combined with equation (21) gives
Assuming that real marginal costs mc t are linearly correlated to output gap, mc t = κ (y t − y t ) we arrive at equation (1) in the main text.
B Different information sets within the private sector
In this section we show formally how we introduce heterogeneity in the information sets of the private sector. Specifically, we assume that a fraction P does not observe the inflation target, while the rest of agents observes π t , at least partially, as a function of the degree of transparency. As stressed in section 4, the observed inflation target is deeply dependent on how much transparent central bank is, according to 
The loss function for the private sector will be function of the fraction of informed and uninformed agents, hence it will be a weighted average of the loss for the informed part and the uninformed part, with weights equal to P and (1 − P ). 
